A Value for Fuzzy Games with $n$ Players and $r$ Alternatives (Numerical Optimization methods, theory and applications) by Masuya, Satoshi & Nakai, Teruhisa
Title
A Value for Fuzzy Games with $n$ Players and $r$
Alternatives (Numerical Optimization methods, theory and
applications)
Author(s)Ma uya, Satoshi; Nakai, Teruhisa




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
AValue for Fuzzy Games with $n$ Players and $r$ Alternatives
(Satoshi Masuya)




Various soeial phenomena, for example, the allocation problem of expenditures and
the election problem have been analyzed in the framework of cooperative games defined by
characteristic functions, and some value functions have been presented for expres8ing the
influence power or the evaluation value for the game by each player. A8 representative values,
the followings are $weU\cdot known$ : the Shapley value [91, the Banzhaf value [21 and the
$Deegan\cdot Packel$ value [51. Here it must be attended that the characteristic function is defined
for each coalition of players and means the $\max\cdot\min$ payoff of the coalition. In the case that
only two alternatives “Yes” or No are considered, there is no problem, but in the case ofmore
than two alternatives, the $\max\cdot\min$ payoff is seemed to be more $pes8i\dot{m}stic$ than the actual
payoffdepended on the situation of other coalitions. Then a $multi\cdot alternative$ game should be
considered in other frameworks. Bolger [3] considers a $multi\cdot alternative$ game by a
generahzed characteristic function defined for an arrangement, namely, a set of coalitions,
and presents a new power value for $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ games, which is a generalization of the
Shapley value. The $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ Banzhafvalue (the MBZ value) 181 is a generahzation of
the Banzhaf value. The $M\cdot N$ index presented by Masuya and Nakai 161 is a generalized
$Deegan\cdot Packel$ index for $multi\cdot alternative$ voting games. Furthemore Masuya and Nakai [7]
presents the generalized $multi\cdot altemativeDeegan\cdot Packel$ value (the GMDP value) for
general $multi\cdot alternative$ game8.
Most of traditional $c\infty perative$ games with characteristic functions treat crisp coalitions
only. However there are many actual situations where some players participate partially in a
coalition. For $consider\dot{i}g$ such a phenomenon Aubin [11 started the theory of cooperative
fuzzy games. In this recent literature, Iburumi et al. [101 proposes a fuzzy Shapley fiinction
using Choquet integral.
Furthermore most of traditional values are considered under the assumption that all
coalitions are formed by equal probabilities, that is, under the homogeneity among players.
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But in many actual social phenomena, this assumption is not always satisfied. Then some
values permitting the non-homogeneity among players have been presented.
However, a value permitting all of three generalizations, multi alternatives, fuzziness
and $non\cdot homogeneity$ have not been developed as far as we know.
In this paper, inspired by these works, we develop fuzzy games with $n$ players and $r$
alternatives called $multi\cdot alternative$ fuzzy games and propose a new value permitting all of
three generalizations, $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}atives$ , fuzziness and $non\cdot homogeneity$. $Multi\cdot alternative$
fuzzy games are first defined by Tsurumi et al. [111. The value they proposed is defined on
$multi\cdot alternative$ “crisp” games. In this paper, we will first develop a value which is
defined on $multi\cdot alternative$ fuzzy game8. Then we develop multi-alternative fuzzy games
which differ from those by Tsurumi et al. [111 and a value function on the games.
In Section 2, we formulate $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ativeh_{\mathbb{Z}\mathbb{Z}}y$ games which are based on
$multi\cdot alternative$ games and cooperative fuzzy games. In Section 3, we propose a new value
function for $multi\cdot alternative$ crisp games. In Section 4, we propose a new value function for a
class of $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy games and prove that it is the unique one $satis\infty ng$ a certain
axioms system. In Section 5, we give a numerical example called $\mathfrak{N}oee$ Alternative Job
Game“ and compare the new function with other values for traditional $multi\cdot alternative$
games.
2. Development ofmulti-alternative fuzzy games
First, we provide a definition of characteristic function form games. An $n\cdot person$
cooperative game is a pair $(N,v)$ where $N$ is a set of $n$ players and the function
$v;2^{N}arrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfies $v(\phi)=0$ .
We consider cooperative fuzzy games with the set of players $N=\{1,2,\cdots,n\}$ . A fuzzy
coalition is a fuzzy subset of $N$ , which is identified with a function from $N$ to $[0,1]$ . Then
for a fuzzy coalition $S$ and player $i,$ $S(i)indic\dot{a}tes$ the membership grade of $i$ in $S$ , i.e.,
the rate of $i^{\prime i}$ Player’s participation in $S$ . For a fuzzy coalition $S$ , the level set is denoted by
$[S]_{h}=\{i\in N|S(i)\geq h\}for\forall h\in[0,1]$ , and the support is denoted by
$SupPS=\{i\in N|S(i)>0\}$ .
Next, we develop a $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy game. First, we develop a $multi\cdot altemative$
crisp game which is a special $ca\epsilon e$ of a $multi\cdot altemative$ fuzzy game.
There are $n$ players and $r$ alternatives. Let $N=\{1,2,\cdots,n\}$ be the set of players and
$R=\{1,2,\cdots,r\}$ be the set of alternatives. Each player chooses one of the $r$ alternatives or
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chooses none of them. Let $\Gamma_{j}$ be the set ofplayers who choose the alternative $j\in R$ . The set
$\Gamma=(\Gamma_{1},\Gamma_{2},\cdots,\Gamma_{r})$ is called a crisp arrangement. That is, each crisp arrangement $\Gamma$
satisfies $\Gamma_{1}\cup\cdots\cup\Gamma_{r}\subseteq Nand\Gamma_{k}\cap\Gamma_{l}=\phi(\forall k\neq l)$ . For any $S\in\Gamma$ , we call $(S,\Gamma)$ an
embedded coalition(ECL). Let $EC(N,R)$ be the set of ECLs on $N$ and $R$ . Let $CA(N,R)$
be the set of crisp arrangements on $N$ and $R$ . Then the function
$v:EC(N,R)arrow \mathbb{R}_{+}=\{z\in \mathbb{R}|z\geq 0\}$ is called a $m\bm{t}ti\cdot alternative$ crisp game on $N$ with $r$
alternatives provided $v(\phi,\Gamma)=0$ . Let $MG_{0}(N,R)$ be the set of $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ crisp
games on $N$ and $R$ . These games are es8entia11y equivalent to extended $multi\cdot alte\bm{o}ative$
games by Tsurumi et al. [111.
Let $S_{j}$ be the fuzzy coalition which $ch\infty ses$ the alternative $j\in R$ . Then we will call
$S=(S_{1},S_{2},\cdots,S,)$ a fuzzy arrangement. A fuzzy arrangement is a generalization of a crisp
arrangement which is Presented above. In $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy games, we assume that
each player can not belong to more than one coalition simultaneously. That is, each fuzzy
arrangement $S$ satisfies Supp $S_{k}\cap SuppS_{l}=\phi(\forall k\neq l)$ . If $T\in S$ , we call $(T,S)$ an
embedded fuzzy coalition(EFC). Let $FA(N,R)$ be the set of fuzzy arrangement8 on $N$ and $R$ .
That is, $FA(N,R)$ i8 the set of fuzzy arrangements which satisfy that each element of a
fuzzy arrangement is a fuzzy sub8et of $N$ . Let $EF(N,R)$ be the set of EFC8 on $N$ and $R$ .
Then the function $v:EF(N,R)arrow \mathbb{R}_{*}$ is caUed a $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy game on
$N$ with $r$ alternatives provided $v(\phi,S)=0$ . Let $MG(N,R)$ be the set of $m\bm{t}ti\cdot alternative$
fuzzy games on $N$ and $R$ . Clearly, $MG_{0}(N,R)\subseteq MG(N,R)$ holds. Traditional cooperative
fuzzy games are $multi\cdot alternative$ fuzzy games in case of $r=1$ .
In the rest of this section, we give some concepts which are used for following sections.
$DeBwbon1$ . Amembership grade matrix (grade matrix) is defined as follows:
$U=[u_{ij}]$ $(i=1,\cdots,n;j=1,\cdots,r)$
where $0\leq u_{ij}\leq 1$ for $\forall i,j$.
$u_{\iota j}$. mean8 the rate of “potential“ participation of player $i$ to the coalition which $ch\infty ses$ the
$j^{th}$ alternative. The $j^{th}$ column of $U$ is denoted by $U_{j}$ . Let $N_{R}$ be the grade matrix with
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$u_{j}=1$ for $\forall i,\forall j$ .
Definition 2. For a grade matrix $U$ , the 8et of level arrangement $[[U]]_{h}$ and the support
$Supp[U]$ are defined as follows:
$[[U]]_{h}=\{\Gamma\in CA(N,R)|i\in\Gamma_{j}\Rightarrow u_{i/}\geq h\forall i\in\cdot N,\forall j\in R\}for\forall h\in[0,1]$
$Supp[U]=\{\Gamma\in CA(N,R)|i\in\Gamma_{J}\Rightarrow u_{y}>0\forall i\in N,\forall j\in R\}$ .
$[[U]]_{h}$ is the set of crisp arrangements in which the rate of potential participation of players
is no le8s than $h$ .
Definition 3. For a fuzzy arrangement $S$ , the level arrangement $[S]_{h}$ is defined a8 follows:
$[S]_{h}=([S_{1}]_{h},\cdots,[S_{r}]_{h})for\forall h\in[0,1]$ .
$[S]_{h}$ is a crisp arrangement in which the rate of participation of each player for the coalition
which choose8 each alternative is no less than $h$ .
The class of all fuzzy subsets of a fuzzy set $U\subseteq N_{R}$ is denoted by $L(U)$ . Particularly,
$L(N,R)$ denote8 the class of an fuzzy subsets of $N_{R}$ . $P(W)$ denotes the class of all crisp
subsets of a set ofcrisp arrangements $W$ . Particularly, $P(N,R)$ denotes the ffimily of8ets of
crisp arrangements on $N$ and $R$ .
3. The new value for $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ crisp games and its axiom system
First, we develop the new function on $MG_{0}(N,R)$ . We pemit the $non\cdot homogeneity$
among players in the new function. This means that each crisp arrangement i8 not always
formed uniformly. Then we introduce a probabihty distribution on the set of crisp
arrangements $p;CA(N,R)arrow[0,1]$
$( \sum_{\Gamma aC4(N.R)} p(\Gamma)=1)$ . $p$ is an arbitrary discrete probability distribution and means a
probability of forming the crisp arrangement.
Defnition 4. Given $W\in P(N,R),$ $W_{i./}(i\in N, j\in R)$ is defined as follows:
$W_{\text{ }}=\{\Gamma\in W|i\in\Gamma_{j}\}$ .
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Then we define the new function $\tilde{f}^{j}$ : $MG_{0}(N,R)arrow(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n})^{P(N.R)}(j=1,\cdots,r)$ as follows:
$\tilde{f}_{i}^{j}(v)(W)=\{\begin{array}{ll}l\epsilon\Gamma\sum_{\Gamma\epsilon W}p(\Gamma)\cdot\frac{v(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma)}{|\Gamma_{j}|} ifW_{l.j}\neq\phi 0 othe \text{ } ise.\end{array}$ (1)
$W$ is the set of crisp arrangements which can be formed. $f_{l}^{\sim}(v)(W)$ means the expectation
ofpayofk ofplayer $i$ for the alternative $j$ in the game $v$ on $W$ .




$v_{j}(W)$ is the expectation of the $payo\Re$ which the coalition choosing $j^{\iota h}$ alternative gets
when $W$ is the set of arrangements which can be formed.
$DeBrjHon6.$ ($j$ zezvplayeron $multi\cdot altemative$ crisp games)
Let $v\in MG_{0}(N,R),W\in P(N,R)$ sati8fying $W_{i.j}\neq\phi$ for an alternative $j\in R$ , and let $P$
be a probabihty distribution on $CA(N,R)$ . If $\overline{v}_{j}^{t}(W)=0$ holds, $i$ is called a $j$-zero player
on $W$ .
Definition 7. Let $W\in P(N,R)$ and two players $i,k\in N,$ and let $p$ be a probabihty
distribution on $CA(N,R)$ . Interchanging $i$ with $k$ in any $\Gamma\in W$ , we make the new crisp
arrangement $\Gamma’$ . Two players $i$ and $k$ are called $syw\bm{u}et\dot{n}c$ in the set $(W,v,j,p)$ if and
only if
$p(\Gamma^{\iota})v(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma’)=p(\Gamma)v(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma)$ $(\forall\Gamma\in W)$. (2)
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Definition 8. Given $v,w\in MG_{0}(N,R)$ the sum gam$ev+w$ is defined as follows.
$(v+w)(\Gamma_{1},\Gamma)=v(\Gamma_{J},\Gamma)+w(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma)$ $\forall(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma)\in EC(N,R)$
In the following, we give a new axioms system which a value for $multi\cdot alternative$ crisp
games should satisfy. Let $\tilde{\pi}^{J}$ be a function from $MG_{0}(N,R)$ into $(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n})^{P(N.R)}$ $(j=1,\cdots,r)$ .
Note that for any $v,w\in MG_{0}(N,R),$ $v+w\in MG_{0}(N,R)$ holds.
Axiom $MC_{1}$ . Given $v\in MG_{0}(N,R),W\in P(N,R)$ and a probabihty distribution $p$ on




Axiom $MC_{1}$ means that the sum ofthe power of each player for an alternative coincides with
the expectation of the payoffs which the coalition choo8ing the alternative gets. This axiom is
different from that of the Bolger value or the MBZ value.
Axiom $MC_{2}$ . Given $v\in MG_{0}(N,R),W\in P(N,R)$ such that $W_{l.j}\neq\emptyset$ and a probabihty
distribution $p$ on $CA(N,R)$ , the following holds.
$\tilde{\pi}_{i}^{j}(v)(W)=0\Leftrightarrow i$ ’
$s$ a $j$ zelvplayeron $W$
Axiom $MC_{2}$ is also different from that of the Bolger value or the MBZ value as well as Axiom
$MC_{1}$ . The Bolger value and the MBZ value give the value $0$ for $jnul1pJ\epsilon yen$ .
A $j$ nullPlayermakes a contribution to a game more than a $j$ zelvplayer
Axiom $MC_{3}$ . Let $v\in MG_{0}(N,R),W\in P(N,R)$ and $i,k\in N$ , and let $p$ be a probability




$AxiomMC_{3}$ is a generalized axiom as that of the Bolger value or the MBZ value which is
called the symmetry axiom.
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$AxiomMC_{4}$ (linearity). Given $v_{1},v_{2}\in MG_{0}(N,R)$ and $W\in P(N,R)$ , the following holds.
$\pi_{i}^{j}(v_{1}\sim+v_{2})(W)=\pi_{j}^{j}(v_{1})(W)+\pi_{i}^{j}(v_{2})(W)\sim\sim$
For $AxiomMC_{4}$ , the same discussion is valid with Axiom $MC_{3}$ .
TAeofew 1. The new function $\tilde{f}^{\text{ }}$ : $MG_{0}(N,R)arrow(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n})^{P(N.R)}$ defined by (1) is the unique
function which satisfies Axiom $MC_{1}$ through $MC_{4}$ .
4. The new value for $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fkizzy games and its axioms system
Generally speaking, it is not easy to give the explicit form of the new function on any clas8
of fuzzy games. Tsurumi et al. [10] introduces a class $G_{C}(N)$ which is the 8et of fuzzy games
with Choquet integral forms and proves that any $v\in G_{C}(N)$ is both monotone
nondecreasing and continuous with regard to rates ofplayers‘ participation. Then we use thi8
concept. We define a generalization of $G_{C}(N)$ which is denoted by $MG_{C}(N,R)$ .
$DeBwbon9$ . For $S\in FA(N,R)$ , we put
$Q(S)=\{S_{j}(i)|S_{j}(i)>0,i\in N,j\in R\}$ . We write the elements of $Q(S)$ in the increasing order
as $h<\cdots<h_{q(S)}$ where $q(S)$ is the cardinality of the set $Q(S)$ . Then a game
$v\in MG(N,R)$ is called to be a $multi\cdot alternative$ fuzzy game ‘with Choquet integral fom’ if
and only if the following holds:
$v(S_{j},S)=( \sum_{l-1}S)v^{\uparrow}([S_{j}]_{h_{l}},[S]_{h})\cdot(h_{l}-h_{l-1})$ $\forall S\in FA(N,R)$
(3)
where $h=0,$ $v’\in MG_{0}(N,R)$ .
Let $MG_{C}(N,R)$ be the set of an $multi\cdot altemative$ fuzzy games with Choquet integral fOrms.
Finally, we define the new value function on $MG_{C}(N,R)$
$f^{j}$ : $MG_{C}(N,R)arrow(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n})^{L(N,R)}(j=1,\cdots,r)$ as follows:
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$f_{j}^{j}(v)(U)=\lambda_{1}^{U)}\tau\tilde{f}_{l}^{j}(v)([[U]]_{h})\cdot(h_{l}-h_{l-1})$ . (4)
where $\tilde{f}_{l}^{j}$ i8 defined by the equation (1). $U$ is a grade matrix which is defined on Section 2.
Note that (5) is a Choquet integral of the function $U$ with regard to $\tilde{f}_{i}^{j}(v)$ .
We give some definitions before proposing an axioms system.
DefinitaOn 10, Given $U\in L(N,R)andk,l\in N$ , for any $S\in L(U)$ we define a new grade
matrix $P_{u}[S]$ as follows: its $(i,j)$ element is given by
$P_{u}[S](i,j)=\{\begin{array}{ll}s_{u} ifi=k;j=1,\cdots,rs_{b}. if i=l;j=1,\cdots,r (i=1,\cdots,n;j=1,\cdots,r)s_{l/} otherwise\end{array}$
, that is, the matrix $P_{kl}[S]$ is obtained by exchanging the $k^{th}$ low for the lth low in the
grade matrix $S$ .




Note that the equation (6) denote8 a Choquet integral of the function $U$ with regard to an
expectation of $v$ .
Defuition 12. ( $jze\iota 0$ player on $m\bm{t}ti\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy games) Let $U\in L(N,R)$ and
$i\in SuppU_{j}$ , and let $p$ be a probability distribution on $CA(N,R)$ . When $\overline{v}_{j}^{l}(U)=0$
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whenever $U_{j}(i)= \max_{\iota_{1}\epsilon N.j_{1}\in R}U_{j_{1}}(i_{1})$ , player $i$ i8 called a $j$ zeroplayer on $U$ .
Defuition 13. Let $v\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ and $U\in L(N,R)$ . If the following holds, $i$ and $k$ are
called symmetnc in the set $(U,v,j,p)$ .
$-$
$v_{j}(S)=v_{j}(P_{ik}[S])$ $(\forall S\in L(U))$
In the following, we give an axioms system which a value for $multi\cdot alteaative$ fuzzy
games should satisfy. Let $\pi^{j}$ be a function from $MG_{C}(N,R)$ into $(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n})^{L(N.R)}(j=1,\cdots,r)$ .
Note that for any $v,w\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ , $v+w\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ holds. It can be proved that Axiom
$MF_{1}$ through $MF_{4}$ is a generalization of Axiom $MC_{1}$ through $MC_{4}$ to $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$
fuzzy games respectively. Thu8, the same interpretation is valid for $A\dot{n}omMF_{1}$ through $MF_{4}$
as that $ofAxiomMC_{1}$ through $MC_{4}$ respectively.
Axiom $MF_{1}$ . Given $v\in MG_{C}(N,R),U\in L(N,R)$ and a probability distribution $p$ on
$CA(N,R)$ , the following holds.
$\sum_{lcN}\pi_{l}^{j}(v)(U)=\overline{v}_{j}(U)$.
$\pi_{i}^{j}(v)(U)=0$ $ifi\not\in SuppU_{j}$
$AxiomMF_{2}$ . Given $v\in MG_{C}(N,R),U\in L(N,R),i\in SuppU_{j}$ , player $i$ is a jzenplayer on
$U$ ifand only if $\pi_{l}^{j}(v)(U)=0$ .
$A\bm{x}iomMF_{3}$ . Let $v\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ and $U\in L(N,R)$, and let $p$ be a probabihty distribution
on $CA(N,R)$ . If $i\in N$ and $k\in N$ are symmetric in the 8et $(U,v,j,p)$ , the following hold8.
$\pi_{j}^{J}(v)(U)=\pi_{k}^{j}(v)(U)$
$AxiomMF_{4}$ . For any $v_{1},v_{2}\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ and $U\in L(N,R)$ , the following holds.
$\pi^{j}(v_{1}+v_{2})(U)=\pi^{j}(v_{1})(U)+\pi^{j}(v_{2})(U)$
Theorem 2. The function $f^{j}$ : $MG_{C}(N,R)arrow(R_{+}^{n})^{L\langle Nl)}$ defined by (5) is the unique fhnction
which $8ati_{8}fies$AxlOm $MF_{1}$ through $MF_{4}$ .
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Proposition 1. Let $v\in MG_{C}(N,R)$ , $U=[u_{u}],$ $U’=[u_{u}’]\in L(N,R)$ where $u_{u}’\{\begin{array}{l}=<\end{array}\}u_{u}$
$if(k,l)\{\begin{array}{l}\neq=\end{array}\}(i,j)$ .Then $f_{i}^{j}(v)(U)>f_{i}^{j}(v)(U’)$ .
5. The ComParison of the New Value with the Others
Evaluating the influence power of each player in a numerical example which is called
“Three Alternative Job Game”, we compare the new function with the MDP value by Masuya
et al. [71, the Bolger value and the MBZ value.
TAneAlternative Job Game:
There are three working 8tudent8 $A,$ $B$ and C. There are three jobs 1, 2 and 3 and they are
about to perform one job respectively. If each student performs a different job each other,
student A gets payoff8 and student $B$ get8 payoff6 and student $C$ gets payoff4. If student A
performs ajob by himself and student $B,$ $C$ perfom their jobs together, student A gets payoff5
and the group of students $B,$ $C$ gets payoff 18. If student $B$ performs a job by himself and
student $A,$ $C$ perform their jobs together, student $B$ gets payoff3 and the group of student8 $A$,
$C$ gets payoff25. If student $C$ performs a job by himself and student $A,$ $B$ perform their jobs
together, student $C$ gets payoff 1 and the group of student8 $A,$ $B$ gets payoff30. If all students
perfom their jobs together, the group of students $A,$ $B$ and $C$ gets payoff50.






$v(\{A,B,C\},(\{A,B,C\},\{\phi\},\{\phi\}))=50,v(T,\Gamma)=0$ for each $(T,\Gamma)$ if $T=\phi$,
$v(\Gamma_{j},\Gamma)=v(\Gamma_{j},P(\Gamma))$ where $P(\Gamma)$ is an arbiffary pernutation of $\Gamma$ ,
e.g. $v(\{A\},(\{A\},\{B\},\{C\}))=v(\{A\},(\{B\},\{C\},\{A\}))$ .
We assume that players are homogeneous in this game. Furthemore, we assume that the
crisp arrangement satisfying $\Gamma_{1}\cup\Gamma_{2}\cup\Gamma_{3}\subset N$ is not formed because we would like to
compare the new function with other values which is defined on traditional $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$
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games. Then the probability distribution of crisp arrangements $p$ is assumed to be
uniformed as follows:
$p(\Gamma)=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{1}{27} if \Gamma_{1}\cup\Gamma_{2}\cup\Gamma_{3}=N0 therwise.\end{array}$
Also, we assume the grade matrix $U$ is given by
$U=\{\begin{array}{lll}1 1 11 0.5 0.51 0.5 0.25\end{array}\}$ .
Each participation rate represents each player’s rate of not loafing on his job if he perfoms
the job. That is to say, we a8sume that player $B$ and $C$ decrea8e their participation rate for the
coalition choosing alternative 2 and 3.
In this situation, how much influence power does each student have ?
In Tablel, 2, 3, we show the value for each player in each solution with respect to
altemative 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In order to compare them we nomahze each solution. The
grade matrix $U$ for the crisp game in Table 1, 2, and 3 can be regarded to $[u_{ij}]=1$ $\forall i,\forall j$ .
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We compare the new function with the MDP value, the Bolger value and the MBZ value
from Tablel, 2 and 3. The8e four values evaluate player $B$ at the similar level. That is to say,
difference among these four values is shown by the difference among powers ofplayer A and C.
The comparison of the value of A and $C$ for the MDP value, the Bolger value and the MBZ
value has been completed in our previous paper [71. Then we compare the new function with
the MDP value because the new function is proportional to the MDP value when the game is
crisp and the probabihty distribution is a unifom distribution. The MDP value evaluates
player A better than player C. On the other hands, the new value evaluates $C$ better than A
for alternative 1. For alternative 2, the new value evaluates $B$ and $C$ lower than the MDP
value. For alternative 3, the new value evaluates player $C$ much lower than the MDP value.
In traditional $c\infty perative$ fuzzy games, when the rate ofparticipation of a player for his
coalition decrease8, his influence power decreases too. However, thi8 example show8 that by
decreasing the rate of participation for coalitions which choose particular alternatives, a
player can increase his influence power for other alternatives. Then his influence power
decreases for the alternative for which he decreases the rate of participation for the coalition.
These phenomena are not observed in the framework of traditional cooperative games. It is
seemed to be very interesting result.
6. Conclusion
We developed fuzzy games with $n$ players and $r$ alternatives called $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$
fuzzy games. Furthermore, we propose a new value on a class of $multi\cdot alte\bm{m}ative$ fuzzy
games. The new value considers players’ $non\cdot homogeneity$. Furthemore, we show an axioms
system on which the new value is based. The numerical example show8 $intere8ting$ results
which are not observed in the framework of traditional cooperative games.
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